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Abstract  
During decades of political and social change, corruption has become a pervasive and habitual factor of Latin 
American governments. The literature of political economic of corruption largely debates about the negative 
impact that inefficient anti-corruption policies have on state accountability. Undoubtedly this work 
contributes to the literature by providing important supportive evidence on this matter. Using data from the 
Latinobarómetro collected between 2006 and 2010, this study explores the relationship between citizens’ 
perception of corruption and trust toward public institutions, more commonly called institutional trust. 
Empirical evidence suggests that citizens’ trust increases if they perceive improvements in reducing corruption. 
These results are robust also to the inclusion of several socio-economic covariates as well as when we replicate 
the analysis for each institutional trust item separately. Our analysis inevitably connects with the literature of 
quality of government institutions and makes of the Latin American context the new geopolitical ground for 
this complex debate. 
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Resumo  
Durante décadas de mudanças políticas e sociais, a corrupção se tornou um fator pervasivo e habitual nos 
governos latino-americanos. A literatura sobre a economia política da corrupção debate, em grande parte, os 
impactos negativos que políticas anticorrupção ineficientes têm na responsividade do Estado (state 
accountability). Sem dúvida, este trabalho contribui para a literatura ao oferecer evidências importantes de 
suporte para esse assunto. Com dados do Latinobarómetro coletados entre 2006 e 2010, este estudo explora 
a relação entre a percepção dos cidadãos em relação à corrupção e à confiança nas instituições públicas, mais 
comumente chamada de confiança institucional. Evidências empíricas sugerem que a confiança dos cidadãos 
cresce se eles percebem melhoras na redução da corrupção. Esses resultados são robustos também para a 
inclusão de várias covariáveis socioeconômicas, bem como quando replicamos a análise para cada item de 
confiança institucional separadamente. Nossa análise inevitavelmente estabelece relação com a literatura sobre 
a qualidade das instituições governamentais e faz do contexto latino-americano o novo terreno geopolítico 
para esse debate complexo. 
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Introduction 
This work explores the nexus between citizens’ perception of corruption and 
their trust towards public institutions, named here institutional trust, in Latin America.  
Latin America is a region that has undergone democratic transitions and 
reforms throughout the twentieth century. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile 
moved from military regimes to democracies in the 1980’s forming part of third wave 
of democratization (HUNTINGTON, 1991). According to the Washington 
Consensus, others, such as Argentina and Peru went through crucial economic policy 
changes to move towards a more regulated open-market (RODRIK, 2006; 
MARANGOS, 2009; NORTH, 1991). Armed and civil conflicts, high levels of crime 
and drug-trafficking have also been part of the region’s history. Even though, 
democracy is established in this region, its institutions are weak and not well 
consolidated (GONZÁLEZ, 2006). 
Previous research suggests that the political system and its institutions of 
authority must be regarded as legitimate by society in order to have consolidated 
democracies (LIPSET, 1994; CHEIBUB et al., 1996). Furthermore, Norris (1999, p. 
205) states, that institutions are the core and “basic pillar of society”. Others have also 
said that institutions are the bridge between citizens and governments, and thus 
represent basic citizen interests. Consequently, the stability and legitimacy of 
democratic governments depends on political institutions (LEVI and STOKER, 2000; 
CITRIN and MUSTE, 1999).  
Indeed, trust in public institutions, so called institutional trust, has been argued 
by most scholars to be of fundamental importance to the establishment, survival and 
functionality of democratic systems (CHANG and CHU, 2006; HAKVERDIAN and 
MAYNE, 2012; HETHERINGTON, 1998; EASTON, 1965). This is because 
citizens’ belief in institutions is vital for their legitimation (ANDERSON and 
TVERDOVA, 2003). As such, over the past two decades there has been an increasing 
interest in institutional trust, in particular in the field of comparative political science 
and behavioural economics (DALTON, 2004; NORRIS, 1999; HARDIN apud 
PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000). It has been suggested that in practice citizens 
differentiate between different institutions regime. As a result, different institutions are 
given different levels of trust.  Moreover, many have expanded Easton’s classification 
of political system support to allow distinction between support for the community, 
political actors, support for democracy, institutions etc. (NORRIS 1999; CANACHE; 
ALLISON, 2005; DALTON, 1999). However, institution effectiveness and correct 
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functioning can be greatly affected by the corrosive effect of corruption, producing 
discontent and loss of citizen confidence and trust (HAKVERDIAN and MAYNE, 
2012).  
This is particularly the case in Latin America. The complex phenomenon of 
corruption has been a strong factor affecting citizens’ confidence in institutions and 
the legitimacy of the democratic political system, constraining the pace of development 
of the region. Chile and Uruguay (SELIGSON, 2006) have the lowest levels of 
corruption. However, the rest of the region consistently shows relatively high levels of 
corruption, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency 
International in each year reports1. Therefore, in almost the whole region, corruption 
is part of the day-to-day life of citizens. This endemic corruption affects the 
performance and proper functioning of political institutions and is reflected in the 
confidence that individuals place on them. 
The literatures explaining citizens’ institutional trust often focuses on cultural 
and institutional factors (NORRIS, 1999; MISHLER and ROSE, 2005).  
Institutional trust has been widely studied in relation to well-established 
democracies, in particular since the 1960s (PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000; NORRIS, 
1999). However, the Latin American context has remained unfolded (BOHN, 2013). 
Therefore, it is important to test the established theories relating to corruption and 
institutional trust in a comparably new setting. Latin American countries represent a 
very interesting context of analysis as even though they exhibit distinctive political, 
economic and institutional trajectories, they have similarities with respect to public 
institutions and their Civil Law Systems. This is due to the fact that as colony of the 
Spanish Empire (with the exception of Brazil colonised by Portugal) most of the 
countries share similar formal institutions and legal systems (BRIERLEY and DAVID, 
1985). Furthermore, it is important to examine the state of trust in the region after 
more than a decade of political and economic changes. Moreover, the region scores 
high in corruption, with little improvement according to the Corruption Perception 
Index by International Transparency. Therefore, what makes analysis of this region 
 
1 Transparency International is a non-governmental organization that informs about the state of political 
corruption in the world. Each year it scores countries on how corrupt their public sectors are through 
the Corruption Perception Index.  Available at: <http://www.transparency.org/>. Accessed on: Apr. 05, 
2021.  
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compelling, is the potential association that the high level of corruption could have on 
citizen trust in public institutions. 
The countries within Latin America are elected democracies, though 
institutions are still weak and with little structure. The democratic regime and 
mechanisms are still under constant evolution relying upon the effectiveness of public 
institutions to make democracy work (CORRALES and PENFOLD-BECERRA, 
2011). Where governance is affected by instability, however, pervasive problem of 
corruption is more likely to flourish. This has a negative impact on the quality of 
institutions as unable to meet citizens’ expectations and needs with the consequence of 
reducing citizens’ institutional trust. This is important to consider because, in countries 
where corruption is part of day-to-day life, citizens’ assessment of political performance 
could be highly influenced by the pervading culture of corruption (ECKSTEIN, 1988 
apud MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). That is to say that, citizens in Latin American 
countries could have generated some tolerance to the ineffectiveness of governments to 
tackle corruption and thus become disaffected (MORRIS and KLESNER, 2010). 
Therefore, it is important to explore whether the perception of corruption affects 
institutional trust.  
Our analysis uses survey data collected from the Latinobarómetro during the 
period 2006 to 2010 and includes 18 Latin American countries. Institutional trust is a 
composite variable that includes trust items in five public institutions (government, 
congress, police, judiciary and political parties). From the same survey data, we also 
collect the main variable of interest of corruption indicating citizens positive perception 
of a reduction of corruption in the last two years at the time of the interview.  
We conduct a series of linear regression analysis based on Ordinary Least 
Square Estimations and we consistently find that trust towards public institutions 
increases among citizens that perceive an improvement in the reduction of corruption. 
These results are statistically significant and they are robust to the inclusion of several 
key covariates such as social trust and satisfaction with democracy as well as to the 
inclusion of different socio-economic and demographic characteristics. We also 
disentangle the composite variable of institutional trust and we replicate our 
estimations for each individual trust item. Consistently we find that the nexus 
institutional trust – perception of corruption remains unaltered as perceived 
improvements in reduction of corruption seems to be a positive and statistically 
significant predictor of each individual trust item.  
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Our results confirm empirical evidence found in other geopolitical contexts 
including east Europe and Asian democracies. This outcome clearly emphasises the 
importance of further and more detailed investigations on institutional transparency 
within the Latin American region. The remaining paper is structured as follows           
The next section will present the existing literature discussing trust and 
corruption concepts as well as the distinction between the institutional and cultural 
approach; Section 3 discusses the contextual background; Section 4 presents data and 
variables, Section 5 presents the empirical results; Section 6 concludes.     
Relevant Literature 
Institutional trust is defined as the trust that citizens place in public institutions 
and it plays a very important role in contemporary democracies (HAKHVERDIAN 
and MAYNE, 2012). Hetherington (2005) argues that citizens’ trust in institutions 
reflects the perception individuals have of whether a government is generating 
outcomes in accordance to their expectations. Others have related institutional trust to 
the confidence that individuals place in political actors and institutions to operate in a 
manner that will benefit them, or at least in a way that will not cause any harm 
(HAKHVERDYAN and MAYNE, 2012; LEVI and STOKER, 2000; NEWTON and 
NORRIS, 2000). For instance, Pharr and Putnam (2000) and Dalton (2004) consider 
institutional trust as a democratic good itself, important for the health and 
consolidation of democratic systems. Additionally, trust contributes to the support of 
democratic ideals (SELIGSON, 2002). Institutional trust has also been related to key 
political and non-political attitudes, including public policy preferences and 
compliance with government regulation and civic duty (CHANLEY, RUDOLPH and 
RAHN, 2000; HETHERINGTON, 2005; LETKI, 2006; apud HAKHVERDIAN 
and MAYNE, 2012). 
According to Thomas Hobbes’s idea of the social contract, individuals have 
renounced, explicitly or tacitly, some of their freedoms in order to allow the authority 
or government to protect and safeguard their remaining rights. Individuals must 
perceive authorities as impartial entities that protect their interests in benefit of the 
whole community (PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000; ROTHSTEIN, 2021). 
Consequently, democratic institution should be trustworthy.  Levi and Stoker (2000) 
explained that trustworthiness is an attribute that an institution or individual possesses, 
which reassures others that it/she will not betray their trust. Hence, trustworthy 
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institutions should act in a fair and neutral manner taking into account all or the most 
important interests of the community that they represent (LEVI and STOKER, 2000). 
Institutions therefore have to respect the duties and principles of democratic 
institutions and the trust that citizens have placed in them. In this sense, political 
institutions should be competent (HARDIN apud PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000) 
and meet citizens’ expectations.  
Institutional wrongdoing such as engagement of its public officials on corrupt 
exchanges can undermine citizens’ confidence that their interests will be safeguarded 
(CHANG and CHU, 2006). 
Corruption is a historically well-established phenomenon, which in many 
societies occurs in both the public and private sphere (HODGSON and JIANG, 
2007). However, corruption manifests in different ways according to the social and 
cultural context where the illicit act is produced. As such corruption is difficult to 
conceptualise. For instance, the exchange of presents between citizens and public 
officials are a part of Thai culture and social behaviour (PHONGPAICHIT and 
PIRIYARANGSAN, 2001 apud CHANG and CHU, 2006). Whereas this behaviour 
would be condemned as corrupt practice in western cultures (KURER, 2005). 
Corruption as a concept is further complicated by the fact that, due to its social nature, 
it evolves following new patterns with new malign effects in different societies 
(CHANG and CHU, 2006). As Bardhan (1997) points out, corruption has always 
been present in different places and times with different “damaging consequences”. 
This complexity makes corruption hard to understand and measure, and can hinder 
the success of anti-corruption strategies, especially in developing countries.  
Therefore, corruption has been defined in different ways. Kurer (2005, p. 223) 
suggests, “[…] the evolution of the term has indeed been closely connected to the 
breaking of public office norms and therefore to public disapproval”. While Bardhan 
(1997, p. 1321) defined corruption as “[…] the use of public office for private gains, 
where an official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the 
principal) engages in some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult 
to monitor for the principal”. Nevertheless, all the different definitions of corruption 
found in the literature share two common factors. First, the mistreatment or abuse of 
authority by those in charge of a public office or public role. This entails accepting, 
solicitating or extorting a bribe. Second, corruption is also thought to involve a private 
advancement. That is to say the corrupt official gains “[…] personal, close family or 
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private clique pecuniary” benefits (KURER, 2005, p. 225), or transfers them to groups 
or parties to which he or she belongs (BARDHAN, 1997 apud TREISMAN, 2000).  
To unify these factors, several scholars and international organizations have 
opted for a loose definition of corruption. Klitgaard (1988) for example gives a 
simplistic definition: “discretion plus monopoly minus accountability equals 
corruption” (LAWSON, 2009, TEORELL, 2007 and ANDVIG and FJELDSTAD, 
2001 apud PERSSON, ROTHSTEIN and TEORELL, 2013). However, the most 
common and straightforward definition is “the misuse of public office for private gain” 
(SANDHOLTZ and KOETZLE, 2000, p. 32 apud ANDERSON and TVERDOVA, 
2003; TANZI, 1998; KAUFMAN, 1997; ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1999; Transparency 
International). This is the definition that will be used throughout the present study 
The literature of the revisionists considers that corruption might be beneficial 
for a country in order to achieve development. For instance, Huntington (1968), 
famously argued that “[…] the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over 
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over centralized honest 
bureaucracy”. In other words, corruption might be functional to the maintenance of 
the political system as it can “[…] provide immediate, specific, and concrete benefits 
to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society” 
(HUNTINGTON, 1968 apud CHANG and CHU, 2006). Therefore, corruption 
operates as a function of distribution and allocation of resources for groups that 
otherwise would be excluded (BECQUART-LECLERQ, 1989 apud SELIGSON, 
2002). For Lien (1986), corruption contributes to the allocation of resources and 
bribery encourages efficiency “[…] since only the lowest-cost firm can afford the largest 
bribe in a competitive bidding environment” (apud CHANG and CHU, 2006, p. 
260).  Moreover, it has been argued that corruption contributes to economic growth 
(HUNTINGTON, 1968 apud CHANG and CHU, 2006).  
In contrast to this literature and aligned with our perspective, modern studies 
on corruption have shown its detrimental effects. Some scholars have focused on the 
consequences of corruption, while others have focused on its causes. As a result, there 
is a considerable extended literature on the negative effect of corruption on economic 
growth and investment and reduction of capital inflow (MAURO, 1995; TANZI and 
DAVOODI, 2001; GYIMAH-BREMPONG, 2002; KAUFMANN and WEI, 2000; 
LAMBSDORFF and CORNELIUS, 2000). These studies suggest that political 
corruption dismisses the most fundamental aspects of democratic states. Kaufmann 
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and Wei (2000) showed that the quality of institutions decline with the level of 
corruption. Moreover, Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2001) found that countries 
with a high level of corruption have a child mortality rate. Such countries have also 
been observed to invest in more military spending and arms procurement (GUPTA, 
DE MELLO and SHARAN, 2000). Countries with high indices of corruption also 
reported poor tax collection revenue in relation to their GDP (TANZI and 
DAVOODI, 1998; FRIEDMAN et al., 2000). Interestingly, bureaucratic countries 
have reported an association between corruption and the state of entry rules governing 
new businesses (DJANKOV et al., 2002). Similarly, Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000) 
suggest that countries with soft government regulation reported higher level of 
corruption. 
Institutional Trust between Cultural and Institutional Theory 
Institutional trust has been often explained under the lenses of cultural and 
institutional theories (NORRIS,1999; MISHLER and ROSE, 2005; KAASA and 
ANDRIANI, 2021). This literature stresses on the perspective that both cultural 
aspects as well as institutional factors may influence to some degree citizens’ view and 
trust towards public institutions (KAASA and ANDRIANI, 2021). 
Cultural theory considers trust as a cultural feature, embedded and transmitted 
within the society. Institutional trust is a product of individual judgments from citizens 
towards political institutions. However, this perspective considers social norms, values, 
common customs and beliefs that are present in any society, as important to the 
establishment of trust. The basis of trust is thought to be family bonds, face-to-face 
interaction and sharing of experiences among members of a group. The next level of 
trust is interpersonal or social trust. Connection between members of a community 
enhances the levels of trust among them, generating positive attitudes towards strangers 
(FUKUYAMA, 1995; LEVI, 1997). Hence, the trust in political institutions will be a 
reflection of interpersonal trust (MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). 
To answer the question as to why trust is important for cultural theories, 
Mishler and Rose (2005) present three points. Firstly, cultural theory assumes a mutual 
relationship between institutional trust and support for the regime. This way, citizen 
trust in democratic institutions contributes to enhancing adequate institutional 
performance, and consequently an increase in citizen support (EASTON, 1965 apud 
MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). Secondly, trust contributes to the “acceptance of 
democratic values and ideas”. Thirdly, trust helps promote the “quality and quantity 
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of political involvement” (NORRIS, 1999; PUTNAM et al., 1993 apud MISHLER 
and ROSE, 2005, p. 1053). Individuals who are more closely connected tend to 
participate in political and social activities (FUKUYAMA, 1995; PUTNAM, 2000 
apud MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). Furthermore, Trusting people implies a more 
positive attitudes about society (BREHM and RAHN, 1997). Therefore, societies 
where citizens trust others reported to have more “civic culture” which manifested in 
the political support that is essential for an effective democratic system (PUTNAM et 
al. 1993 apud MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). Moreover, trusting societies are more 
likely to expend resources in social programmes as well as more active governments and 
low levels of criminality (USLANER, 2002).  
There are a variety of discussions in the literature of the causal link between 
social and institutional trust. Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, (1993) assumes that the 
relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust is one-directional, where 
interpersonal trust is conducive to institutional trust. In contrast, others have argued 
that causal arrows go in both directions. Brehm and Rahn (1997), for example, 
statistically demonstrate mutual influence between the two, though they find that 
confidence in public institutions has a stronger impact on interpersonal trust than vice 
versa. Levi (1996 apud LEVI and STOKER, 2000) identifies a similar linkage, noting 
how building confidence in governmental institutions has the potential to restore levels 
of interpersonal trust. Empirical studies tend to confirm this linkage. Rothstein and 
Stolle (2002, p. 16) expressed “[…] government institutions generate social trust only 
if citizens consider the political institutions to be trustworthy.”  Additionally, “[…] 
societies in which the impartiality of the order institutions (police, judiciary) cannot 
be guaranteed, which is expressed by lower citizens’ confidence in these types of 
institutions, producing lower generalized trust (and vice versa)” (ROTHSTEIN and 
STOLLE, 2002, p. 21). 
Nevertheless, according to Norris (1999), there is not a significant relationship 
between interpersonal and institutional trust at the individual level. This means, “[…] 
socially trusting people are not necessarily politically trusting and vice versa” 
(NEWTON and NORRIS, 2000 p. 72 apud PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000).  It has 
also been argued that in the modern world, solid social and political context and 
integration build upon the confidence in institutions rather than confidence among 
citizens (NORRIS, 1999). Although this conclusion was drawn at the individual level, 
this relationship seemed to be more robust at the national level. Veenstra (2002) 
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supported this argument with findings in Canada where interpersonal trust did not 
increase institutional trust. Similarly, Blind (2007) states that trustworthy government 
produces interpersonal trust, rather than the opposite. Norris (1999) argues further 
that political trust is distributed irregularly regardless of personality and social types, 
because institutional performance influences everyone unequally. For instance, poor 
economic growth, government corruption or a lack in tackling crime is spread among 
the citizens independently of their level of social trust, affecting their satisfaction with 
government and institutions. 
According to the Institutional theory, trust and the support for the democratic 
regime are generated by the rational response to individual or collective assessment of 
institutional performance (NORTH, 1991;  MISHLER and ROSE, 2001 apud 
MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). For instance, economic growth, political performance, 
safeguard of civil liberties, rule of law and the reduction of levels of corruption are 
commonly related to institutional trust and political support (apud MISHLER and 
ROSE, 2001; 2005; MAURO, 1995; PUTNAM et al., 1993, KNACK and KEEFER, 
1997; WHITELEY and CASEY, 2004 apud BJORNSKOV, 2010). In fact, 
Hetherington (1998) found that improvements in state-effectiveness, improvement of 
the economy and congress approval fostered political trust. In this regard, poor 
performance of government, inefficient and poor services of public institutions, weak 
and ill-functioning institutions due to corruption can lead to a negative impact on the 
confidence that citizens have in institutions. In contrast, institutions that show 
efficiency in these areas will generate more trust (MISHLER and ROSE, 2005).  
To analyse Institutional trust, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) used Scharpf’s 
(1999) performance criteria for how citizens assess public institution. One is 
procedural performance, which is related to “input”; the other is policy performance 
related to “output”. Procedural performance refers to the rules and procedures of the 
whole political system and as such expressions of fairness and equality. On the other 
hand, policy performance alludes to individual evaluations of the way in which public 
institutions and actors implement and provide services, and respond to citizen 
priorities. If these criteria are met, high levels of institutional trust are expected 
(HAKHVERDIAN and MAYNE, 2012; SCHARPF, 1999). Applying this to this issue 
of corruption, it has been suggested that corruption hinders the ability of institutions 
to conduct their procedural performance in an equal manner (DOIG and 
THEOBALD, 2000). Indeed, it has been said that “Countries in which petty 
corruption is pervasive must [...] endure disabling low levels of trust in public 
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institutions, with all the extremely negative consequences for commitment to collective 
projects, civic behaviour, level of crime and public order” (SELIGSON, 2002, p. 412).  
Nonetheless, citizens’ assessment of government and institutions performance 
is likely to have a high degree of cultural influence (ECKSTEIN, 1988 apud 
MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). For example, in societies where corruption is 
widespread, the perception of corruption could be less noticeable or important, than 
in cultures where corruption is rare (MISHLER and ROSE, 2005). Hence, the impact 
on institutional trust is going to be less severe in societies where corruption is part of 
daily life. This could be the case in Latin America, where corruption is relatively 
diffused (BOHN, 2013).  Nevertheless, robust empirical evidence shows a negative 
relationship between citizens perception of corruption and institutional trust even in 
contexts with a relatively endemic level of corruption including Asian democracies 
(CHANG and CHU, 2006) and post-communist countries (KAASA and 
ANDRIANI, 2021). 
The Contextual Background 
Latin America is a region with a long history of corruption, since 
decolonisation, but especially during the period of the Cold War. The rampant 
corruption was tolerated during that period by the United States to avoid the potential 
support of communism by Latin American countries (SELIGSON, 2002). However, 
the shifted of neoliberal reforms, open trade (RODRIK, SUBRAMANIAN and 
TREBBI, 2004) and efforts to eradicate the narcotics trade have contributed to the 
increase of corruption in this region. In particular, in policy spheres, within political 
parties and judicial institutions (SELIGSON, 2002).    
Weyland (1998 apud SELIGSON, 2002) has argued that despite the 
replacement of dictatorships with democratic systems, corruption was present during 
the military regimes. Consequently, shifting to a democratic system generated more 
corruption since there is “an increase in the number of palms that need to be greased” 
(WEYLAND, 1998 apud SELIGSON, 2002). Moreover, new liberal reforms open 
new areas of the market, increasing the opportunities for bribery. Even after years of 
democratization in Latin America, in 2001 The Economist stated that “Certainly, 
privatisations have too often been tainted by corruption, and contracts padded, and 
bribery and influence-peddling remain common. The drugs trade and the need to 
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finance political campaigns have both played a role in spreading corruption” 
(WANTED…, 2001). 
The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has also showed 
continuous evidence of high levels of corruption in Latin America. Most of the Latin 
America countries are signatories of the UN and Inter-American Convention against 
corruption, and The Organization of American States (OAS) convention in this 
matter. In several anti-corruption organisations platforms such as Transparency 
International corruption has been associated to a terrible cancer impacting the 
legitimacy and integrity as well as reducing citizens’ trust in democracies.2   
This is somewhat illustrated by the several high-profile political corruption 
wrongdoings of former Latin American presidents including Carlos Menem in 
Argentina and Luis González Macchi, in Paraguay. Furthermore judges, politicians, 
generals and high-level business people in Peru have been under investigation due to 
corruption networks in existence during the Alberto Fujimori mandate. Fujimori was 
sentenced in 2009 for embezzlement though in 2004, Transparency International 
estimated the amount of money appropriated to be over $600 million. In Colombia, 
national officials embezzled a reported $27 million from the education budget (LIMA, 
2013). 
Using data from the Latinobarómetro during the period 2006-2010, Figure 
1shows the average trend of institutional trust across Latin America. The graph shows 
a drop in institutional trust between 2006 and 2007 and a subsequent increase from 
2007 until 2009, while it remains almost steady during the following year.3 
González (2006) has counted nine “severe political cris[es]” connected to 
institutions in Latin America in between 2000 and 2006 (Paraguay 2000, Perú 2000, 
Venezuela 2003, Bolivia 2003 and 2005, Ecuador 2000 and 2005, and Nicaragua 
2005). Corruption is believed to be the underlying cause of these crises, affecting 
citizens’ confidence in public institutions 
 
 
2 <https://voices.transparency.org/about>.  Accessed on 12 June 2018.   
3 The graph was produced in order to visualise the changes of institutional trust. Because the data of the 
Latinobarómetro is not longitudinal but rather prospective cross section data, a line plot was used instead 
of the repeated measures ANOVA to examine changes in institutional trust in Latin America during the 
period 2006 to 2010. The graph below illustrates mean confidence level at each year with the respective 
95% confidence Interval.  
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Figure 1 – Institutional Trust in Latin America 2006-2010 
 
Source: Author’s computation from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010. 
 
Looking at the trend of reduction of corruption, still using data from the 
Latinobarómetro, Figure 2 reports a continued reduction in corruption from 2006 to 
2009. Yet, there was a slower decrease from 2009 to 2010.  
 
Figure 2 – Reduction of corruption 2006-2010 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010. 
 
Therefore, the pattern of institutional trust and corruption in this region for 
the period of 2006 to 2010 was the same. The exception being the period 2006 to 
2007, when despite improvements in the level of corruption, confidence in public 
institutions slightly dropped. This could have been a product of the turbulent political 
crisis across the region exposed by González (2006) as mentioned above. 
Data and Variables 
This research makes use of the compiled data from the Latinobarómetro for 
the period 2006-2010, a public opinion survey in 18 Latin American countries on 
annual basis. Each country is represented by a sample of 6,000 observations for a total 
of 101,055 observations along the five waves of the survey. 





REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 15, n. 1, p. 247-274, jan.-abril 2021 
Measuring Institutional Trust 
We construct a composite variable of institutional based on five distinct 
composite trust items each of them referring to citizens’ trust on a specific public 
institutions including trust in the government, trust in the police, trust in the congress, 
trust in the judiciary, and trust in political parties. This composite measurement of 
institutional trust is aligned with the ones used in the literature (CHANG and CHU, 
2006; HAKVERDIAN and MAYNE, 2012). 18 Latin American countries were 
included (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, 
República Dominicana, Uruguay, Venezuela) for the period of 2006 to 2010 with a 
sample size of 101,055 observations.  
In line with studies of institutional trust (CHANG and CHU, 2006; 
HAKVERDIAN and MAYNE, 2012), the questions used to measure institutional 
trust was: “Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each 
of the following groups, institutions or persons mentioned on the list: a lot, some, a 
little or no confidence?.” Each item reported values from 1-4, where 1 represented the 
highest degree of confidence and 4 the lowest. However, the values were changed in 
the way that 1 represents the lowest and 4 the highest degree of confidence in the 
respective public institution.   
At the country level, the measure of trust was produced by a composite variable 
of the mean confidence in these five institutions, so that mean confidence was used as 
the main measure of institutional trust in line with Chang and Chu (2006) and 
Hakverdian and Mayne (2012). 
Measuring Corruption 
The independent variable for corruption is operationalized by the 
Latinobarómetro question: “How is the progress on reducing corruption in state 
institutions (2 years) Much, Some, Little, No progress at all”. Each item reported 
values from 1-4. The values were rescaling in a way that 1 represents no progress at all 
and 4 much progress. This allows to interpret the respective regression coefficient in 
the empirical analysis in a more straightforward way. A positive coefficient will 
eventually indicate an increase in institutional trust among people that perceive an 
improvement in the reduction of corruption. 
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Measuring Additional Covariates 
Following previous literature, other explanatory factors are considered 
including interpersonal trust, satisfaction with democracy, socioeconomic status, 
education, employment, gender, and age (ANDERSON and TVERDOVA, 2003; 
MISHLER and ROSE, 2001; CHANG and CHU, 2006; SELIGSON, 2002).  
In relation to social trust the Latinobarómetro asked respondents “Generally 
speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too 
careful when dealing with others. You can trust most people or you can never be too 
careful when dealing with others?”.  
In order to analyse how individuals assigned their trust in institutions 
performance the variable of satisfaction with democracy was included (CHANG and 
CHU, 2006). The corresponding question is: “In general, would you say that you are 
very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in [nation]. Very satisfied, rather satisfied, Not very satisfied or Not 
at all satisfied?”  
Age was used reported as a categorical variable as follows: 16-25 years, 26-40 
years, 41-60 years, and 61 years and above 
Socioeconomic status and education were included in line with Seligson 
(2002). It is reported by the author that higher socioeconomic level and education tend 
to be more critical as they are more knowledgeable. Gender was also included; 
according to Chang and Chu (2006) there is a belief that women in Asia are “politically 
marginalized”.  
Table 1 shows the variables and describes the composite items and scales. We 
provide more detailed information about our sample and data across Tables 2 to 4 
showing respectively Distribution of Confidence levels for each institutional trust item 
(Table 2), the descriptive statistics of the variables of corruption (Table 3), and 
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1= no confidence at all 
2= little confidence 
3= some confidence 
4= A lot of confidence 
1= no confidence at all 
2= little confidence 
3= some confidence 
4= A lot of confidence 





Progress on reducing corruption in 
state institutions (2 years) 
Recalled: Progress Reduction 
Corruption 
1= No progress at all 
2= little 
3= Some 
4= Much  
 
 Have you or someone in your 
family known of a corruption act? 
Recalled: Corrupt act known 
1= Yes 
2= No  
 
 Total Corruption (Composite 
Variable) 
  






4= 61 and more  
 







6= Incomplete high 
7= Complete high  
 
 Gender 0=male 
1=Female 
 
 Satisfaction with Democracy 1=Not at all satisfy 




 Interpersonal Trust 1=You can never be 
too careful when 
dealing with others  
2= You can trust most 
of the people  
 






 Employment 1=self employed  
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Source: Authors’ computation from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010. 
 
Table 2 – Distribution of trust levels in the different type of institutions 
Trust in Government 
 N % Cumulative % 
No confidence at all 22952 22.7 23.0 
Little confidence 33366 33.0 56.4 
Some confidence 29985 29.7 86.4 
A lot of confidence 13617 13.5 100.0 
Trust in Police 
No confidence at all 27127 26.8 27.2 
Little confidence 35811 35.4 63.1 
Some confidence 28508 28.2 91.7 
A lot of confidence 8269 8.2 100.0 
Trust in Congress 
No confidence at all 29448 29.1 30.4 
Little confidence 35878 35.5 67.5 
Some confidence 24936 24.7 93.2 
A lot of confidence 6553 6.5 100.0 
Trust in Judiciary 
No confidence at all 27690 27.4 28.5 
Little confidence 37820 37.4 67.4 
Some confidence 25441 25.2 93.6 
A lot of confidence 6216 6.2 100.0 
Trust in Political Parties 
No confidence at all 40295 39.9 40.9 
Little confidence 36152 35.8 77.6 
Some confidence 18628 18.4 96.5 
A lot of confidence 3432 3.4 100.0 
Mean Trust Levels 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
 2.11 0.68 3.00 
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Table 3 – Sample Corruption Variables 
Progress Reduction Corruption (2 Years) 
 N % Cumulative % 
No progress at all 26406 26.1 27.2 
Little progress 32511 32.2 60.7 
Some progress 29697 29.4 91.2 
Much progress 8518 8.4 100.0 
Source: Authors’ computation from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010. 
 
Table 4 – Social demographic and other baseline characteristics of the sample 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
 N % Cumulative % 
Not at all satisfied  16293 16.1 16.9 
Not very satisfied 40158 39.7 58.4 
Rather satisfied  30281 30.0 89.7 
Very satisfied 9948 9.8 100.0 
Social Trust 
You can never be too careful 
when dealing with others  
77674 76.9 78.9 
You can trust most of the 
people 
20326 20.1 99.6 
Age Summary 
16-25 24258 24.0 24.0 
26-40 34625 34.3 58.3 
41-60 28442 28.1 86.4 
61 and more  13730 13.6 100.0 
Gender 
Male 48920 48.4 48.4 
Female 52135 51.6 100.0 
Self Employed 
No 31652 31.3 49.1 
Yes 32855 32.5 100.0 
Public Company Employee 
No  57049 56.5 88.4 
Yes 7458 7.4 100.0 
Private Company Employee 
No 46553 46.1 72.2 
Yes  17954 17.8 100.0 
Student 
No 58267 57.7 90.3 
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Yes 6240 6.2 100.0 
Education 
Illiterate 10220 10.1 10.1 
Incomplete primary 21244 21.0 31.1 
Complete primary 16893 16.7 47.9 
Incomplete Secondary, 
Technical 
16445 16.3 64.1 
Complete Secondary, Technical 20032 19.8 83.9 
Incomplete High 8338 8.3 92.2 
Complete High 7883 7.8 100.0 
Socioeconomic Level 
Very bad 2911 2.9 2.9 
Bad 14335 14.2 17.1 
Not bad 43667 43.2 60.3 
Good 32535 32.2 92.5 
Very Good 7607 7.5 100.0 
Source: Authors’ computation from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010. 
Empirical results 
In this section we present our empirical analysis.   
Before conducting our regression analysis, the five composite items of 
institutional trust have been tested with respect to their internal consistency using 
Cronbach’s Alpha. A Cronbach’s Alpha in this instance of about 0.80 shows strong 
internal consistency among these variables. Furthermore, the result suggested that the 
Cronbach’s Alpha would not improve upon removal of any of the variables. Given 
their high internal consistency a mean confidence score was calculated using 
information from all five variables.  
We proceed, then, by conducting a series of linear regressions using Ordinary 
Least Square estimations.   
Table 5 shows our ordinary least square estimations where institutional trust is 
a function of corruption presented in a “horse race” regression including the extensive 
set of covariates and sociodemographic characteristics. Model 1 represent our baseline 
model where the dependent variable corresponds to our composite variable of 
institutional trust. The results of model 1 show that institutional trust increases among 
individuals perceiving a progression in the reduction of corruption. As the respondent 
to the survey perceives an improvement in the reduction of corruption by 1unit, 
institutional trust increases by 0.188. This correlation is statistically significant at 1% 





REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 15, n. 1, p. 247-274, jan.-abril 2021 
level of statistical significance This seems to be consistent also to the inclusion of a 
series of covariates.  
We proceed with an additional robustness check. We disentangle the 
institutional trust indicator and we replicate our ordinary least square estimations for 
each institutional trust item separately. This is because the composite indicator might 
ignore substitutive and complementary relationships between the single components 
(Model 2-6). Additionally, institutions directly involved in the respect of the law and 
order and prosecution of corrupt acts might have a higher weight. Model 2-6 show 
that the relationship between corruption and the single institutional trust item remains 
unaltered. Trust in government has the highest coefficient. This suggests that the 
government would gain more trust than the other institutions considered here from a 
perceived reduction of corruption.       
This negative association between perception of corruption and institutional 
trust recalls the institutional approach mentioned in Section 2. The perception of 
corruption relates to the citizens evaluation of the correct functioning of the public 
institutions. This reflects their perception that public official and administrators 
operates with impartiality and integrity prioritizing the public interests to the personal 
gain (WANG et al., 2007). This relationship has been found consistent in other 
geopolitical contexts both at individual-level indicator (HABIBOV, AFANDI  e 
CHEUNG, 2017; MCALLISTER, 2014) as well as society-level indicator (VAN DER 
MEER, 2010; HAKHVERDIAN and MAYNE, 2012; VAN DER MEER and 
HAKHVERDIAN, 2017; DONG and KÜBLER, 2018).   
Our estimations seem also to confirm aspects of the cultural theory as 
institutional trust increases with social trust. This means that individuals that trust 
people in general, tend to trust more public institutions. This positive association seems 
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.168** .147** .186** .176** 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
.246** .342** .172** .208** .272** .231** 
Social Trust .065** .059** .031** .092** .075** .050** 
Age Summary .011** .055** .020** .002 .003 -.022** 
Gender -.015** -.047** -.038** -.015* -.003 .010 
Public Company 
Employee 
.081** .068** .076** .068** .077** .110** 
Private Company 
Employee 
.030** .022* .041** .010 .029** .041** 
Student .078** 0.46** .110** .053** .094** .103** 
Education -.007** .007** .001 -.014** -.013** -.015** 
Socioeconomic Level .030** .019** .026** .018** .033** .055** 
Level of statistical significance ** p<0.001  *p <0.05 
Source: Authors’ computation on data from Latinobarómetro Survey 2006-2010.    
 
Aligned with previous works, satisfaction with democracy is a positive and 
significant predictor of institutional trust (HACKVERDIAN and MAYNE, 2012). 
Our estimations also suggest a negative and statistically significant association between 
education and institutional trust. This is in line with Seligson (2002) and Chang and 
Chu (2006). Individuals with a higher level of education are more aware of 
institutional failures and more critical of the political system. 
Similarly, gender results to be negatively and statistically significantly associated 
with citizens’ trust in institutions. Chang and Chu (2006) explain that, for instance in 
the context of Asian democracies, this might be the result of the “politically 
marginalization” of women. Although this is more mitigated in Latin America, women 
in our analysis show less trust in institutions than men. 
Conclusions 
The pervasive effects of corruption have affected Latin America for decades. As 
a region, Latin America has also undergone democratic transitions and reforms 
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throughout the twentieth century. This work has analysed the potential affect that the 
high level of perceived corruption could have on citizen trust in political institutions.  
Our results show that in all the functional form specifications institutional trust 
is positively and statistically significantly associated to individuals’ perception of an 
improvement in reducing corruption. This outcome is valid and consistent to the 
inclusion of a diversified battery of covariates.    
Our estimations also suggest that social trust is positively associated to 
institutional trust as the cultural theory approach predicts.   
Interestingly, when we consider the trust items individually, data shows that 
political parties are the least trusted institution across Latin America. This could be due 
to the reported lack of available time and opportunity for new political parties to 
develop (LLANOS and SAMPLE, 2008). This result is of significant interest since 
political parties are the main channel between citizens and their representatives. 
Distrust has been shown to cause voters’ apathy (SELIGSON, 2002) as it takes time 
to re-gain trust once lost it (EASTON, 1965; GAMSON, 1968). The fact that political 
parties were the least trusted institution, therefore, generates serious challenges for 
future politicians in this region. 
That being said, Chile provides an exception to the general rule in Latin 
America. Through years Chile has been scoring to be a ‘very clean’ country by the 
Perception of Corruption Index. Accordingly, in this research Chile reported the 
highest confidence in public institutions as well as the higher percentage of confidence 
in the police.  
Our analysis is not immune of limitations.  
One of the main constraints of this study, common in all studies in this matter, 
is the measure of corruption. The secrecy surrounding corruption makes it difficult to 
estimate internal and external validity. Very rightly, Bohn (2013) stresses the 
importance of distinguishing between the perception of corruption and the actual 
exposure to it. This is because the perception of corruption might be far more 
widespread than what in reality is (SELIGSON, 2002). Seligson (2002), for instance, 
measures corruption by the personal experience with corruption or victimization. 
Though, this is still not a perfect way to capture the total effect of corruption as it 
might seize the regular or petty corruption but not the grand corruption for example 
(SELIGSON, 2002). Within the perspective of the state-citizens relationship, we 
claim, though, that social and individual preferences are consistently affected by 
cognitive aspects such as individuals’ perception and believe about rent-seeking 
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behaviour and functioning of public institutions. In this respect, citizens’ perception 
of corruption needs to be considered as a key benchmark from policy makers and 
administrator that are willing to consolidate this state-citizens relationship in a more 
sustainable way.  
It is important to mention that perception of corruption as well as trust towards 
public institutions are influenced by the media and how they report the news 
(CHANG and CHU, 2006). Indeed, as Seligson (2002) suggests, in Latin America, 
state control over the media and unethical behaviour of political leaders might 
contribute to a focus on ‘state scandals’ and alter the citizens’ trust in institutions. 
Exploring more the role of the media might help to explain the unexplained variation 
detected in our empirical analysis.  
We would like to stress on the fact that our Ordinary Least Square estimations 
suggest correlation as they cannot claim a causal mechanism between institutional trust 
and corruption. Additionally, we are also aware that this empirical approach might 
encounter problems of endogeneity and reverse causality. Still, on the positive side, we 
find that the correlation between corruption and institutional trust is statistically 
significant and follows the same sign even when we include different covariates such as 
social trust, satisfaction with democracy and a large battery of socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics. This relationship remains consistently unaltered also 
when we conduct our estimation for each individual trust item separately.  
In view of our results, we recognise that this work opens up windows for further 
research and investigations.  
An interesting line of research concerns gender and trust. Our analysis suggests 
that women tend to trust less than men public institutions. In view of a more inclusive 
and sustainable democratic society, shedding light on the inter-connection between 
women and institutional trust would help designing more effective policies as well as 
more comprehensive political strategies. Similarly, our results suggest that institutional 
trust increases with age, lacking among youth and young generations. This is 
something that ruling elites should not underestimate as it could potentially foster 
discouragement against “fight[ing] corruption” (MORRIS and KLESNER, 2010). 
The problem of distrust and scepticism is important for democracies to consider 
(CLEARLY and STOKES, 2006; NORRIS, 1999). Future generations might become 
increasingly tolerant to corruption (MORENO, 2002). Therefore, there is a need for 
political parties to work to change their image and act as reliable representatives in the 
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best interest of the electorate, and not in the interest of small elite groups. Replacing 
the “expectation of corruption” with the “expectation of political representation and 
accountability” could help to convert voter apathy and increase political interest in 
younger citizens. 
Finally, and very importantly, from a theoretical perspective, our analysis 
connects with the literature on quality of government institutions (CHANG and 
CHU, 2006; CHARRON, DIJKSTRA and LAPUENTE, 2015; ROTHSTEIN and 
TEORELL, 2008). This literature mainly focuses on European and Asian contexts. 
Our explorative work suggests that Latina America might likely represent the next 
frontier in this complex debate. 
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